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Abstract
Reliability Options are capacity remuneration mechanisms aimed at enhancing security
of supply in electricity systems. They can be framed as call options on electricity sold by
power producers to System Operators. This paper provides a comprehensive mathematical
treatment of Reliability Options. Their value is first derived by means of closed-form pricing
formulae, which are obtained under several assumptions about the dynamics of electricity
prices and strike prices. Then, the value of the Reliability Option is simulated under a real-
market calibration, using data of the Italian power market. We finally perform sensitivity
analyses to highlight the impact of the level and volatility of both power and strike price, of
the mean reversion speeds and of the correlation coefficient on the Reliability Options’ value.
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1 Introduction
Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms (CRM) have been implemented in several electricity markets
worldwide, in order to remunerate explicitly power capacity.1 Among these, the Reliability Option
(RO) mechanism recognizes the option nature of the investments in power capacity and creates a
market for such an option. ROs, firstly proposed in [6, 35], have been implemented in Colombia
(Firm Energy Obligations [13]), in NE-ISO (Forward Capacity Market [18]) and in Ireland [27, 28,
29] and are about to be implemented in Italy [23, 32, 33, 34]. They are tools to commercialize,
through a financial product, the possibility, given by generation capacity, of providing security of
supply by producing electricity. They give their holder, i.e. the System Operator (SO), which
acquires them in a competitive setting, the right to call the generation capacity to produce power,
and to receive the positive difference between the electricity price that effectively occurs in the
market and a pre-defined price. Such a pre-defined price corresponds to the strike price of the
option, and it is set to represent the value that power has at the specific level for which load is
not shed, i.e., it is the highest system marginal price compatible with load provision with no load
shedding.
In this paper, we evaluate ROs following the financial approach2, which requires to identify
the stochastic property of the asset under evaluation, and to assume that, in a complete market,
a continuous hedging between the financial derivative and the underlying asset is possible. At a
first glance, this assumption seems quite hard to be met in the electricity sector, given that the
underlying asset of the option is electricity, which is not a storable good3. However, derivatives can
be and are indeed written on several underlying assets that are not liquidly traded, such as interest
rates or temperatures (see e.g. [7, Chapter 15]). What is needed for the application of risk-neutral
pricing based on hedging is the existence of liquid assets that are traded and that correlate with
the underlying of the derivative, such as forwards. The seminal paper [5] has questioned such
an assumption, considering the relationship between derivative (future) prices and spot prices in
markets with limited liquidity and risk averse agents. However, we believe that the assumption
of limited liquidity was more justified at the beginning of the liberalization process of the power
market, while this concern is less justified now, after several years of functioning of liberalized
electricity markets. This approach is shared by other scholars, who have evaluated exotic options
on electricity, such as spark-spread options (options on the differential between power prices and
the heat content of the fuel, [15, 20]), Asian options (options written on average prices, [11]) or
options which are implicit in demand response mechanisms, [31].
We formulate different possible assumptions on the dynamics of the stochastic processes on
which the RO depends, and estimate the relative RO value. ROs are complex options on power
supply which can have different maturities and can be exercised several times at different, and
possibly random, strike prices. Therefore, we provide a comprehensive mathematical treatment of
all their aspects.
Though many authors, as seen above, have evaluated various exotic options on electricity, to
the best of our knowledge our paper is the first one to evaluate ROs under different assumptions
on the electricity price process.4 Several models for electricity prices have been proposed in the
literature (see e.g. [3, 11, 19, 20, 25, 36] and the book [2] for a presentation and critical discussion
of various models), and it would not be feasible to present RO pricing formulae for each one of
these. For this reason, we choose a set of simple and significant ones, and present semi-explicit
pricing formulae that have clear economic interpretations. We first start from the simplest possible
1See [14], ch. 22 and 23, for an introduction and an analysis of Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms.
2This is a standard approach to price financial derivatives, see for instance [21].
3At least as long as storage of electric energy by means of conversion into a different form of energy, such as
kinetic energy of water in power dams or as chemical energy in batteries, is limited because of its cost or for technical
reasons.
4 [8] evaluates, through a Monte Carlo approach, a contract composed of a portfolio of 4344 call options on
hourly prices, all with the same strike price. It corresponds to a discrete-time version of the option we consider in
Proposition 3.1.
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assumption about electricity prices and strike prices, increasing then the level of complexity of the
RO design, to allow for a mean reverting underlying, for stochastic strike prices and for possibly
negative (but bounded from below) electricity prices. Furthermore, we simulate the RO value
under different possible assumptions on the parameters, and calibrate the RO parameters against
real electricity market data, namely, the Italian Power Exchange ones. The availability of long
hourly price time series and the forthcoming introduction of RO in the Italian market both justify
the choice.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes ROs and presents a general pricing for-
mula under realistic assumptions. Section 3 provides semi-explicit solutions to the general pricing
formula, for different electricity and strike price models. We start by defining the arbitrage-free
boundaries of RO’s evaluation. We then move from the simplistic model of geometric Brownian
motion (GBM) with deterministic strike, to correlated GBMs with stochastic strike, and, by in-
creasing realism on the model, to the case when both electricity and strike prices are seasonal
and mean-reverting. For all these models, we present semi-explicit pricing formulae. Finally, we
provide some insights for the case of negative prices. In Section 4, we showcase a simulation of
the RO evaluation and perform a sensitivity analysis, using data of the Italian Power market for
estimates and calibration. Section 5 draws conclusions, while all the proofs of the propositions are
in the Appendix.
2 Reliability options
We start by desribing in general what ROs are. These contracts are sold in an auction, typically
once a year, and they aim to deliver electricity with a given T1-length period in advance (lead
time), for a pre-defined period of delivery, which has length (T2 − T1). The rules of the RO
specify that the capacity provider, the subject who sells the option, must commit to deliver a
certain capacity to the subject buying the option, in general the SO. Such a commitment is made
effective by prescribing that the seller must offer in the market an amount of electricity equal to
the committed capacity and return any positive difference between the reference market price and
a previously set strike price K. Each RO contract scheme specifies what the reference market is. In
a first approximation, the reference market can be a convex combination of different markets, such
as the day-ahead and the balancing or real-time ones. In practice, different RO schemes can have
different reference markets. For instance, in Ireland, exclusively the day-ahead market is taken as
a reference, while in NE-ISO it is the real-time one. If we call P the day-ahead market price and
P (b) the price in the balancing market (or in the real-time market), we can define the reference
market price R as the following convex combination
R = λP + (1− λ)P (b),
where, as said, λ ∈ [0, 1] depends on the country: λ = 0 for ISO New England; λ = 1 for Colombia
and Ireland; λ ∈ [0, 1] in the case of Italy (see [23] for a description of the forthcoming Italian
market).
The strike price is in general determined by taking into account the variable costs of the
reference peak technology, that is, the dispatchable technology that would be included in the
optimal generation mix with the lowest unitary investment cost. In actual RO markets, the rule
for the strike price is communicated to potential sellers of ROs before the auction takes place. Thus,
in some implementations it can be treated as a deterministic and constant parameter. However,
it is also possible that the strike price changes over time during the life span of the RO. This is a
possibility envisaged, for instance, in the forthcoming Italian RO scheme, where it is established
that the rule linking the strike price to a reference marginal technology is set before the auction,
but the marginal cost of such a technology is computed every given period (a month) during the
life span of the RO.5 This implies that the strike price can also be conceived as a stochastic process.
5See [23] and [32, 33, 34].
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We shall first derive the RO value starting with the simplest case, and then increase the level of
complexity, to derive a general representation of the value of the RO.
2.1 A simple mathematical model for Reliability Options
The mathematical modeling of the general RO is quite complex, as many auctions and prices are
involved. We simplify it by defining a mathematical model for the case when the reference price
is simply the day-ahead price P , i.e. λ = 1, as it is in the Colombian or the Irish CRM.6 In this
way, only one state variable is needed for the reference market price R, and it is indeed P .
We start by computing the fair price of a RO, written only on the reference price P and based
on a generation capacity, i.e., for a power plant that is already in place. As said at the beginning of
this section, the RO is sold in an auction at a certain time, but it becomes active in a subsequent
time period. Let us denote by t = 0 the auction time and by [T1, T2], with T1 > 0, the time
period when capacity has to be committed. It is assumed that the power plant will be productive
at least until T2. The idea of pricing the RO is to compute the expected operational profits at
time t = 0 (auction time) of the power plant over the period [T1, T2], both in the case when the
capacity provider enters a RO scheme, and in the case it does not. The difference between these
two operational profits will be the fair price of the RO.
We work on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0 ,Q) such that the probability measure
Q is the risk-neutral pricing measure used by the market, and the day-ahead electricity price
P = (Pt)t≥0 is a Q-semimartingale. We consider the simple case of a thermal plant, with total
capacity Q > 0,7 that converts a fuel, for example oil, gas or coal, into electricity. The cost
C = (Ct)t≥0 of running the thermal plant summarizes the fuel price, CO2 price, operational and
other costs. The power plant sells the electricity at time t ≥ 0 when it wins the day-ahead auction,
i.e. when its bid bt is less than or equal to Pt. We adopt the usual simplifications, continuous time
instead of hourly granularity and no ramping penalties/constraints. The plant can decide its bid
process b = (bt)t≥0 to maximize its revenues.
We first evaluate the expected operational profits of the power plant over [T1, T2] in the case
when a RO scheme is not in place, This is the value of the power plant V (T1, T2) at t = 0 and it
depends on the power plant’s income over [T1, T2]. It can be defined as
V (T1, T2) = sup
b∈B
EQ
[∫ T2
T1
e−rtQ1bt≤Pt(Pt − Ct)dt
∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
, (1)
where B is the set of adapted processes on [T1, T2], r is the instantaneous risk-free rate of return
and EQ is the expectation with respect to Q.
Remark 2.1. In this setting, we assume that the investor is risk-neutral. Although here we are not
evaluating financial assets, but rather incomes coming from industrial activity, this is in line with all
the related literature (see e.g. [15, 24, 31]), and is justified by the following financial argument. The
underlying assets P and C could be in principle not storable, or even not traded in some markets.
However, even in such a situation, the risk-neutral evaluation in Eq. (1) can be applied as long as
one can find hedging instruments that can be storable and liquidly traded, and that are correlated
with P and C: for the mathematical derivation of such a result, see e.g. [7, Chapter 15] for vanilla
products like call and put options (as we will end up to have), and [9, Remark 3.6] for structured
6Moreover, we do not consider congestion in the transmission network, and therefore we implicitly assume that
the market for ROs have the same size of the electricity market, namely, that there are no differences between the
pricing zones of the electricity and the capacity markets.
7Q is to be interpreted as the available capacity of a power plant, as described by [22]. In the real-world examples
of ROs, available capacity is computed by measuring the average availability of a power plant over a given time
span (usually a year) and derating the nominal capacity accordingly (as suggested in the academic literature by [12],
and in practical market implementations in [32, 33] for the Italian scheme, and in [30] for Ireland). As an example,
consider a 100MW plant with a maintenance period of one month per year. Its capacity factor is equal to 0.91; this
figure can be used to de-rate the relevant capacity of the plant for the RO, which would amount to 91MW.
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products like that in Eq. (1) and the subsequent ones8. Here, we indeed have such suitable hedging
instruments, i.e. forward contracts on power and fuel (for P and C, respectively), which are liquidly
traded on financial markets, as they are basically equivalent to any other financial asset up to few
days before physical delivery. When physical delivery approaches, in order to maintain the hedging
position it is sufficient to liquidate the position on the maturing future(s) and open an equivalent
new one on another future with a physical delivery farther in time. This is a standard practice in
energy markets, called “rolled-over portfolios”, see e.g. [1, 17] for two applications.
Going back to Eq. (1), it is optimal to choose b such that 1bt≤Pt = 1 if and only if Pt > Ct, i.e.
the optimal bidding process is bt = Ct ∀ t ∈ [T1, T2]. Thus, the final payoff for a thermal plant is
V (T1, T2) = E
Q
[
Q
∫ T2
T1
e−rt(Pt − Ct)+dt
∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
.
We now consider the case when the thermal plant writes a RO with strike price K = (Kt)t≥0. The
plant must now pay back (Pt −Kt)+. Therefore, the value Vro(T1, T2) of the thermal plant with
a RO scheme in place is
Vro(T1, T2) = sup
b∈B
EQ
[∫ T2
T1
e−rtQ(1bt≤Pt(Pt − Ct)− (Pt −Kt)+) dt
∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
.
The bidding strategy bt = Ct is again optimal for all t ∈ [T1, T2]. Thus,
Vro(T1, T2) = V (T1, T2)−EQ
[∫ T2
T1
e−rtQ(Pt −Kt)+ dt
∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
.
In a risk-neutral world, the value RO(T1, T2) of a RO written on the time interval [T1, T2] should
make the investor indifferent between having the original plant without the RO, and having it
with the RO written on it plus the price of the option, i.e. V (T1, T2) = Vro(T1, T2) +RO(T1, T2) .
Therefore, the final result is
RO(T1, T2) = V (T1, T2)− Vro(T1, T2)
= EQ
[∫ T2
T1
e−rtQ(Pt −Kt)+ dt
∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
(2)
Thus, the value of a reliability option issued by a thermal plant is equivalent to the price of an
insurance contract against price peaks. Interestingly enough, notice that the operating strategy of
the power plants does not change. In electricity markets, it is well known that perfectly competitive
markets without CRMs, the so called energy only markets, provide enough incentives to investment,
and the same is true for optimally designed CRMs, since the latter simply anticipate ex ante the
supermarginal profits that investors would gain in energy only markets. In other words, the
amount of remuneration of capacity accruing from perfectly competitive markets for CRMs equals
the expected discounted value of the supermarginal profits gained in electricity markets; in a world
without market failures, the two levels coincide (see [14, Chapter 22]). This is confirmed in our
framework: without market power, the value of operating the plant is independent of the form of
remuneration of power production, i.e., if revenues accrue ex-ante from the CRM or ex-post from
selling electricity in the market.
8This is exactly the same argument used to evaluate derivative assets written on non-tradable quantities like
interest rates, temperature, etc.
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3 Pricing of Reliability Options
3.1 Model-free no-arbitrage bounds
Equation (2) already allows us to produce model-free no-arbitrage bounds on the price of the
RO. No-arbitrage bounds have been derived by [15] for analogous contracts, yet in a different
setting. In fact, in [15], it is assumed that a continuum of forward contracts is traded, both for
electricity and for the relevant fuel (whose spot price here is K), which deliver at any given date
t. However, many energy markets do not satisfy this assumption, and especially forward contracts
on electricity, which guarantee the delivery of power over a period (e.g., [T1, T2]), rather than on a
single date t. Even if this does not jeopardize the evaluation mechanism developed in Section 2, as
these forwards written on a period are liquid assets that can be used for hedging, the no-arbitrage
bounds available in [15] cannot be directly applied to our framework, but must be modified. Notice
that these model-free bounds do not require any assumption on the electricity price apart from P
being bounded from below by a constant price floor −P ∗, with P ∗ ≥ 0. This is consistent with
those electricity markets in which negative prices are allowed with a lower bound (as for instance
in the German and French markets).
We start from the identity
(Pt −Kt)+ = (Kt − Pt)+ + Pt −Kt .
Since 0 ≤ (Kt − Pt)+ ≤ Kt + P ∗, we have
Pt −Kt ≤ (Pt −Kt)+ ≤ Pt + P ∗ .
By multiplying the inequalities by e−rt, integrating and taking the expectation, we have that
QEQ
[∫ T2
T1
e−rt(Pt −Kt) dt
∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
≤ RO(T1, T2) ≤ QEQ
[∫ T2
T1
e−rt(Pt + P ∗) dt
∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
.
The right-hand side represents the forward price of delivering the quantity Q of electricity over the
period [T1, T2]
9 with an additional constant QP ∗ e
−rT1−e−rT2
r , depending on the price floor. We
label
FP (0;T1, T2) := E
Q
[∫ T2
T1
e−rtPt dt
∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
the (unitary) forward price. Then, since RO(T1, T2) ≥ 0, when Kt ≡ K, i.e. with fixed strike, we
can rewrite the no-arbitrage relation above as
Q
(
FP (0;T1, T2)−Ke
−rT1 − e−rT2
r
)+
≤ RO(T1, T2) ≤ QFP (0;T1, T2)+QP ∗ e
−rT1 − e−rT2
r
. (3)
Thus, the value of a reliability option written on a total capacity Q over the period [T1, T2] lies
between the intrinsic value of Q call options on the forward FP (0;T1, T2) and the modified strike
K e
−rT1−e−rT2
r , and Q forwards FP (0;T1, T2) adjusted by an additional constant proportional to
the price floor P ∗.
Conversely, when K follows itself a stochastic process, we define
FK(0;T1, T2) := E
Q
[∫ T2
T1
e−rtKt dt
∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
,
and obtain
Q (FP (0;T1, T2)− FK(0;T1, T2))+ ≤ RO(T1, T2) ≤ QFP (0;T1, T2) +QP ∗ e
−rT1 − e−rT2
r
. (4)
9this is alternatively referred to as flow forward or swap, see e.g.[2].
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Note that, even with a stochastic strike price K, the upper bound is unaffected. On the other hand,
the lower bound is now the intrinsic value of Q exchange options on the forward FP (0;T1, T2) for
the forward FK(0;T1, T2).
The advantage of these no-arbitrage bounds lies in the fact that, even though there is not a
forward contract traded on the market for the total period [T1, T2], this period is usually a multiple
of calendar years, whose contracts are commonly traded. For example, in the Italian RO design,
the period [T1, T2] starts on January, 1 of year Y and lasts until December, 31 of year Y + 2: thus,
FP (0;T1, T2) ends up simply being the sum of the three calendar products for the years Y , Y + 1
and Y + 2. In the case when the stochastic strike K is indexed with some marginal technology
determined in advance (e.g. combined cycle gas turbines), analogous forward contracts possibly
exist for the corresponding fuel (gas in this case).
The no-arbitrage bounds above are model-free, in the sense that they hold for any no-arbitrage
model that we specify in the following for the dynamics of P , and possibly ofK, the only assumption
needed being the existence of a price floor for P . However, to evaluate the RO as a financial
contract, it is necessary to specify the stochastic process modeling electricity prices. The electricity
price shows peculiarities that make it difficult to model, such as strong seasonality and mean-
reversion. For this reason, several processes have been adopted to reproduce the price dynamics.
In what follows, we provide semi-explicit formulae to price a RO over [T1, T2] under different price
dynamics. Note that the price models generally used to evaluate options do not allow for negative
prices. We will use models of this kind in the subsequent sections, while allowing for negative
prices in Section 3.6 below.
3.2 Electricity spot price as a geometric Brownian motion
Let us start with the simplest assumption, i.e. that the price of electricity P evolves as a GBM,
and that the option’s strike price K is a fixed deterministic value. We stress that the former is
an assumption that we already know is unreasonable, in the sense that it cannot be assumed to
provide a realistic representation of the electricity price dynamics. However, it is the simplest
possible assumption that is used to derive explicit pricing formulae for call options. Thus, we treat
it as a first simplified approach to help us presenting the main features of the model. In this case,
the price P , under the risk-neutral measure Q, is assumed to be the solution of the following SDE:
dPt =rPtdt+ σPtdBt, (5)
where B is a one-dimensional Q-Brownian motion and r is the instantaneous risk-free rate of
return.
The price of a RO in this case is equivalent to the time integral over the interval [T1, T2] of
a European call option with strike price K and maturity ranging in [T1, T2]. In the following
proposition, we provide a semi-explicit formula to price the RO, under the assumptions above.
Proposition 3.1. Let the reference market price P follow the dynamics (5). The price of a
reliability option over the time interval [T1, T2] with fixed strike price K ≥ 0 is given by the
following formula:
RO(T1, T2) =
∫ T2
T1
Q
[
P0N(d1(K,P0, t))− e−rtKN(d2(K,P0, t))
]
dt , (6)
where N is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a standard Gaussian random variable
and
d1(K,P0, t) : =
1
σ
√
t
[
ln
(
P0
K
)
+
(
r +
σ2
2
)
t
]
,
d2(K,P0, t) : =d1(K,P0, t)− σ
√
t .
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Proposition 3.1 simply uses the Black and Scholes formula, since RO(T1, T2) can be defined as
the time integral of a family of call options with the same underlying and strike price, indexed
by their maturity in [T1, T2].
10 Thus, it provides a formula that can be applied to compute the
value of the RO, once the parameters upon which the call depends on have been set; namely, the
risk-free interest rate r, the starting price P0 and the electricity price volatility σ.
3.3 Electricity price and strike price as correlated Geometric Brownian
Motions
A first step to increase the level of complexity consists in modeling the strike price as a stochastic
process. Recall that, in ROs, the strike price is the marginal cost of the marginal technology.
Complex RO schemes can allow it to change over time, according to a predefined rule. For instance,
it can be assumed that the strike price is given by the fuel cost of a predefined marginal technology,
such as Combined Cycle Gas Turbines. In such a way, the strike price will be linked to a reference
fuel price. Alternatively, it can be established that the reference price changes at fixed regular
dates according to a given indexing formula, for example monthly, and stays constant in each of
these sub periods.11 Both cases imply that the strike price is a stochastic process. Thus, a first
extension of the model defined in Section 3.2 is to model K and P as two (possibly correlated)
geometric Brownian motions. This means that the prices (Kt, Pt)t≥0 follow a risk-neutral dynamics
of the following type: {
dKt = (r − qk)Ktdt+ σkKtdB1t ,
dPt = (r − qp)Ptdt+ σpPtdB2t , (7)
where (B1, B2) are correlated Q-Brownian motions, with correlation ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. Notice that the
correlation of the two stochastic processes depends on the rules defining the strike price and on
the strike price nature. For instance, if the variable strike price is set to be equal to the marginal
cost of the marginal technology, and if the electricity market is perfectly competitive, the system
marginal price will be equal to the marginal cost of the marginal technology. Thus, the correlation
coefficient would be equal to 1. If, on the contrary, the stochastic strike price equals some weighted
average of different marginal costs at different hours, for instance at peak and off-peak hours,
then the correlation coefficient would be positive but less than 1, since the electricity price P
would be more volatile than the strike price K. Finally, it is also possible that the strike price is
negatively correlated with the electricity price, depending on how the strike price is defined and
on what reference basket it is linked to. However, this possibility is rather unlikely, for the reasons
mentioned above.
The following proposition provides the value of the RO with two GBMs:
Proposition 3.2. Let the reference market price P and the RO strike price K follow the dynam-
ics (7). Then the price of a reliability option over the time interval [T1, T2] is given by
RO(T1, T2) =
∫ T2
T1
(
P0e
−qptN(a1(K0, P0, t))−K0e−qktN(a2(K0, P0, t))
)
dt , (8)
where N is the CDF of a standard normal random variable, and
a1(K0, P0, t) : =
ln
(
P0
K0
)
+ (qp − qk)t
σ
√
t
+
1
2
σ
√
t ,
a2(K0, P0, t) : =a1(K0, P0, t)− σ
√
t ,
σ : =
√
σ2k + σ
2
p − 2ρσkσp =
√
(σk − σp)2 + 2(1− ρ)σkσp .
10Interestingly enough, this result solves also a problem firstly posed in [24], in the framework of firms’ evaluations.
11As mentioned, this is going to be the case of the future Italian RO scheme.
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In contrast to Proposition 3.1, in Proposition 3.2 we used the Margrabe formula with dividends
(see, for instance, [10]), instead of the Black-Scholes one. Here, the RO(T1, T2) value is equal to the
time integral of a family of options to exchange the (random) electricity price P with the (random)
strike price K, again indexed by their maturity. As usual in the Margrabe formula, the relevant
volatility is σ, that can be interpreted as the volatility of the ratio P/K (i.e., of the electricity
price expressed in units of the strike price), which is decreasing with respect to the correlation ρ.
In particular, for ρ → 1 (i.e. when the strike price is highly correlated with the electricity price),
we have σ → |σk − σp|. In this case, when also σk = σp, the volatility vanishes, and the value
of the option is determined just by its intrinsic value. Instead, for ρ → −1 (i.e. when the strike
price is highly negatively correlated with the electricity price), we have σ → σk + σp, i.e., the
volatility is maximized. However, we stress that this latter case is rather unlikely for the case of
RO, as typically a stochastic strike price K is defined in terms of quantities related to electricity
generation (as e.g. the marginal price of the marginal technology, or some related market index),
so that we should expect a positive correlation.
3.4 Mean-reverting electricity price with seasonality
As mentioned, a GBM does not capture typical stylized facts of electricity prices, namely seasonality
and mean-reversion. A natural extension is thus to price the RO when the dynamics of the
reference price reflects the aforementioned stylized facts. In particular, we model the log-spot
price of electricity as a mean-reverting process encoding different types of seasonality by means
of a time-dependent function. This approach has been widely adopted in energy markets, see for
instance [2] and references therein. We first assume a deterministic strike price. In the next section,
we shall remove this assumption.
We define the function describing seasonality trends for all t ≥ 0, as
µ(t) = α+
12∑
i=1
βimonthi(t) +
4∑
i=1
δi dayi(t) +
24∑
i=1
γi houri(t) , (9)
where monthi(t), dayi(t) and houri(t) are dummies for month, day of week and hour, used to
capture different types of seasonality. Specifically, we assume that day can take 4 values: ‘Friday’,
‘Weekend’, ‘Monday’, and ‘other working day’. This captures the differences between working days
and weekend as well as possible first- or end-of-the-working-week effect.
We then consider the day-ahead price P as
Pt = e
µ(t)eXt , (10)
where Xt, under the risk-neutral measure Q, is the solution of the SDE
dXt =− λXtdt+ σdWt , (11)
where W is a one dimensional Q-Brownian motion, σ stands for the volatility and λ > 0 is the
mean-reversion speed.
We have the following:
Proposition 3.3. Let the reference market price P follow the dynamics (9)–(10)–(11). Then the
price of a reliability option over the time interval [T1, T2] with fixed strike price K ≥ 0 is given by
RO(T1, T2) =Q
∫ T2
T1
e−rt [f(0, t)N(d1(K,P0, t))−KN(d2(K,P0, t))] dt , (12)
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where N is the CDF of a normal random variable, P0 = e
µ(0)+X0 and
f(0, t) : =E[Pt|F0] = exp
(
µ(t) + e−λt +
1
2
V ar(t)
)
,
V ar(t) : =
σ2
2λ
(1− e−2λt),
d1,2(K,P0, t) : =
1√
V ar(t)
log
f(t, T )
K
± 1
2
√
V ar(t),
where, by abuse of notation we mean that the definition of d1(K,P0, t) involves the + sign and the
definition of d2(K,P0, t) involves the − sign.
Remark 3.1. Equation (12) is a generalization of Equation (6): in fact, if we let µ(t) := (r − qp −
1
2σ
2)t and λ→ 0, then we reobtain at the limit the model of the previous section. In fact, we have
that mt ≡ X0, V ar(t)→ σ2t,
e−rtf(0, t)→ e(r−qp)t+X0 ,
and
d1(K,P0, t)→ 1
σ
√
t
(
X0 + (r − qp)t− 1
2
σ2t− lnK
)
=
1
σ
√
t
ln
eX0+(r−qp)t
K
− 1
2
σ
√
t .
Thus, the pricing formula in Equation (12) collapses into that of Equation (6).
3.5 Allowing for mean-reverting strike price with seasonality
As a natural extension of the model in Section 3.4, we now consider the case when the strike K
is a mean-reverting process (with seasonality) as well. The dynamics of the state variables then
becomes {
Pt = e
µ(t)eXt ,
Kt = e
ν(t)eYt .
(13)
Here, µ is given by (9) and ν is a seasonality function for K of the same form, while the processes
X and Y are solution to {
dXt = −λxXtdt+ σxdW 1t ,
dYt = −λyYtdt+ σydW 2t , (14)
where (W 1,W 2) are correlated Q-Brownian motions, with correlation ρ ∈ [−1, 1].
Proposition 3.4. Let the reference market price P and the RO strike price K follow the dynam-
ics (13); then the price of a reliability option over the time interval [T1, T2] is given by
RO(T1, T2) =Q
∫ T2
T1
e−rt (fP (0, t)N (d2(K0, P0, t))− fK(0, t)N (d1(K0, P0, t))) dt , (15)
where N is the CDF of a normal random variable, P0 = e
µ(0)+X0 , K0 = e
ν(0)+Y0 and
fP (0, t) : = E[Pt|F0] = exp
(
µ(t) + e−λxt +
σ2x
2λx
(1− e−2λxt)
)
, (16)
fK(0, t) : = E[Kt|F0] = exp
(
ν(t) + e−λyt) +
σ2y
2λy
(1− e−2λyt)
)
, (17)
d1,2(K0, P0, t) : =
1√
V ar(t)
log
fP (0, t)
fK(0, t)
± 1
2
√
V ar(t), (18)
V ar(t) : = σ2x
1− e−2λxt
2λx
+ σ2y
1− e−2λyt
2λy
− 2ρσxσy 1− e
−(λx+λy)t
λx + λy
. (19)
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This result is a similar to that of Proposition 3.3 in the same sense as Proposition 3.2 is similar
to Proposition 3.1: here RO(T1, T2) can be again defined as the time integral of a family of options
to exchange the electricity price P with the strike price K. Here too, the relevant volatility is
V ar(t), which can again be interpreted as the volatility of the ratio P/K (i.e., the electricity price
expressed in units of the strike price: this is made explicit in the proof in the Appendix), which is
again decreasing with respect to the correlation ρ. In particular, for ρ → 1 (i.e. when the strike
price is highly correlated with the electricity price), and λx = λy =: λ (i.e. when the two mean-
reversion speeds are the same), we have V ar(t)→ 1−e−2λt2λ (σx − σy)2. In this case, when σx = σy,
the volatility vanishes, and the value of the option is given just by its intrinsic value. Instead, in
the unlikely case (see the discussion at the end of Section 3.3) when ρ → −1 and λx = λy =: λ,
we have V ar(t)→ 1−e−2λt2λ (σx + σy)2, i.e., the volatility is maximized.
3.6 Possible extension to negative day-ahead and strike prices
In principle, it is possible to allow for negative power prices, since we know this is a possibility
in energy markets, see [16] and references therein. An analogous extension can be also envisaged
for strike prices, especially when these are linked to power prices. A possible approach to model
negative prices is to set negative values −P ∗ and −K∗, for certain P ∗,K∗ ≥ 0, as price floors for
P and K, respectively, and to consider the following shifted dynamics{
Pt =
(
eµ(t)eXt − P ∗) ,
Kt =
(
eν(t)eYt −K∗) . (20)
where µ and ν are again seasonality functions for P and K and the processes X and Y are solution
of Equation (14), in analogy with the previous section.
By setting C := P ∗−K∗, one can prove that the price of the reliability option is now given by
the following expression:
RO(T1, T2) = Q
∫ T2
T1
e−rtEQ
[
(eµ(t)eXt − eν(t)eYt − C)+
∣∣∣F0] dt . (21)
The above formula is the time integral of a family of spread options with a fixed strike price C and
indexed by their expiration date in [T1, T2]. Therefore, considering dynamics of type (20) relates
the problem of pricing a Reliability Option to the problem of pricing a spread option (see [10] for
a survey of classical frameworks and methods for spread options). Unfortunately, a general closed
formula for the pricing of spread options is not available. However, since the RO is in principle a
quite illiquid product, one can use a numerical method to price it in this general case, for example
Monte Carlo.
4 Simulation and sensitivity analysis
In this section we simulate the value of the RO under realistic assumptions on the parameter
values. To do so, we fit the parameters of the electricity price dynamics to a real market, using
data of the Italian market. For simplicity, we consider day-ahead prices only, and use the weighted
average of Italian zonal prices, called PUN (Prezzo Unico Nazionale), ranging from January 1 to
December 31, 2016.
As previously explained, we used dummies to capture monthly, daily and hourly seasonality,
as defined in Eq. (9). We chose ‘January’, ‘Friday’ and ‘hour 1’ as reference groups, against which
the comparisons are made. Figure 1 shows the calibrated seasonality function, plotted against the
historical PUN data. Furthermore, we considered an annual risk-free rate r = 0.01 and, in the
pricing models where the only stochastic variable is the electricity price, we considered K = 40
¤/MWh. According to the scheme to be implemented in Italy, the pricing of the RO starts 4 years
from now, and the option has a maturity of 3 years (T1 = 4, T2 = 7).
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The starting point X0 is taken equal to 0. Table 1 reports the estimated parameters for each
different model, while Table 2 shows the estimated seasonality parameters.
Figure 1: Seasonality function in (9) (solid red line, upper panel) calibrated on historical 2016 PUN
electricity data (solid blue line, upper panel) and residuals (bottom panel).
GBM 1-OU 2-OU
σˆ 5.4041 6.5932 6.5932
λˆ - 294.84 294.84
Table 1: Estimated yearly parameters σˆ and λˆ for each pricing model (electricity price following a Geo-
metric Brownian motion (GBM), electricity price following a mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
(1-OU), correlated electricity and strike prices following mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes (2-
OU)).
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Estimate S.E. pValue Estimate S.E. pValue
Intercept 3.79 0.01 0 hour6 −0.13 0.01 0
month2 −0.22 0.01 0 hour7 −0.01 0.01 0.5
month3 −0.27 0.01 0 hour8 0.1 0.01 0
month4 −0.36 0.01 0 hour9 0.18 0.01 0
month5 −0.28 0.01 0 hour10 0.16 0.01 0
month6 −0.23 0.01 0 hour11 0.12 0.01 0
month7 −0.07 0.01 0 hour12 0.07 0.01 0
month8 −0.21 0.01 0 hour13 0 0.01 0.8
month9 −0.07 0.01 0 hour14 −0.05 0.01 0
month10 0.14 0.01 0 hour15 −0.02 0.01 0.13
month11 0.23 0.01 0 hour16 0.04 0.01 0
month12 0.21 0.01 0 hour17 0.09 0.01 0
Monday −0.01 0.01 0.04 hour18 0.15 0.01 0
Weekend −0.14 0.01 0 hour19 0.22 0.01 0
Working day 0.02 0.01 0 hour20 0.28 0.01 0
hour2 −0.08 0.01 0 hour21 0.27 0.01 0
hour3 −0.15 0.01 0 hour22 0.2 0.01 0
hour4 −0.18 0.01 0 hour23 0.12 0.01 0
hour5 −0.18 0.01 0 hour24 0.03 0.01 0.01
Table 2: Linear regression estimates, standard errors and p-values obtained using the specification in (9).
The base group categories for each dummy variable are month1, friday and hour1.
As mentioned, real electricity prices do not follow GBMs. Therefore, in the simulation, we start
from the model defined in Section 3.4.
4.1 Mean reverting electricity price with seasonality, fixed strike
We simulate the value of the RO using the Monte Carlo methodology. Specifically, we compute
the RO value using 10,000 simulations of the price path of the underlying.
Figure 3 shows the comparative statics for different ranges for the parameters σ and λ and
strike price K. As expected, the higher the strike price, the lower the value of the reliability option
for each value of σ (left panel). On the other hand, both the left and right panels show that, when
σ increases, the RO value rises as well. Moreover, when λ is low, the relative increase in the RO
value is high (right panel). This is consistent with the fact that a low λ allows fluctuations of the
underlying that are far from the long term mean to be more persistent.
4.2 Electricity spot price and RO strike price as correlated OU with
seasonality
We simulate now the value of the RO using the model described in Section 3.5, again by means of
a Monte Carlo method (again using 10,000 runs). We start from a given correlation coefficient, set
at ρ = 0.5, and assume that λK and σK are equal to the ones estimated for the electricity price
and X0 = 0. In line with the PUN mean price, which is equal to 42.77 ¤/MWh, K0 is arbitrarily
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Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis of the results using a yearly σ in the range (0; 2σˆ] with a strike price K in
the range [20; 60] (left panel), and a yearly σ in the range (0; 2σˆ] with and a yearly λ in the range (100; 2λˆ]
(right panel). The RO value is expressed in ¤/MWh.
chosen equal to 40 ¤/MWh, so that, after de-seasonalizing (using the same estimated seasonality
parameters of the PUN price), we obtain Y0 = −0.21.
Figure 4 shows the results when we assume the strike price process to have the same parameters
estimated for the electricity price P . The upper left panel shows that the initial level of the strike
price K0 has no influence on the value of the reliability option. This is due to the magnitude of the
estimated λP , and thus of λK : a mean reversion speed as high as that estimated makes the strike
price process return to its mean level in an amount of time negligible with respect to the maturity.
This implies that the starting point of the process has no relevant impact on the RO value.
The upper right panel of Figure 4 instead shows how sensitive the RO value is to changes in
the electricity price parameters λP and σP (and thus in turn in λK and σK). Similarly to what
we have observed before, the higher the volatility of the underlying (and, in this case, of the strike
price), the higher the RO value. This relationship increases in proportionality as the speed of mean
reversion decreases, since it takes more time to return to the mean, and thus volatility matters
more.
The impact of the correlation factor ρ is instead investigated in the bottom left panel, where
we assess how different correlation factors in the range [−1; 1] affect the price of the reliability
option. When the two assets are perfectly correlated (ρ = 1), the RO value is zero for all levels
of σP . In fact, as seen in Section 3.3, the volatility is minimized and the RO can be interpreted
as an integral of calls, with maturity ranging in the interval [T1, T2], being exactly at the money
at the time of expiration, and thus having zero value. Instead, as shown, when the two processes
are uncorrelated, the level of risk increases, and it reaches its maximum when they are perfectly
negatively correlated. In this case, the volatilities of the two Brownian motions sum up, increasing
the volatility of the option payoff and minimizing the risk of having the calls at the money. Finally,
the bottom right panel shows that the RO price is negatively correlated with the risk free rate r:
a higher r decreases the option value as it lowers the discounted cash flows.
In the previous figures, the parameters for λP and λK , and σP and σK , were tied together,
in the sense that λK and σK were always equal to, respectively, λP and σP . Instead, we now
investigate what happens when σK equals σP as before, but λK changes independently from λP .
Moreover, we also investigate the effects of a variation in σP different from that in σK . Figure 5
and 6 show the results.
The left panel of Figure 5 reports the results for a variation in λK (in the range (0; 2λˆP ] and
shown in log10 scale) independent from the value of λP . The graph shows how K0 hardly affects
the RO value, as it has an impact only when both σK and λK are sufficiently small. This confirms
the result shown above that the initial condition of the parameters matters only when it takes a
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Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis of the results using a yearly σP in the range (0; 2σˆP ] with an initial strike
K0 in the range [20; 100] (upper left panel), with a yearly λP in the range (100; 2λˆP ](upper right panel),
with a correlation ρ in the range [−1; 1] (left bottom panel) and with a yearly risk free rate r in the range
[0; 0.2] (right bottom panel).
sufficient amount of time for them (i.e., for the strike price in this case) to return to their long
term value. The right panel instead shows the sensitivity of the RO value to changes in the yearly
λK (again in the range (0; λˆP ]) independent from the value of λP , and in the correlation factor ρ
(in the range [−1; 1]) (in this graph, σK is always equal to σP and they are in turn equal to σˆP ,
λP = λˆP , and λK is shown in log10 scale.). Here, the ρ value matters more when both λK = λP
and σK = σP . In fact, ρ (negatively) affects the RO value only when it tends to −1 and λK is
closer to the value of λP (note that, in the figure, λK ∈ (0; λˆP ], where λˆP corresponds to the value
of 2.47 in log10 scale). This confirms our intuition that, when the initial value of the electricity
price and the strike price are close and the two random variables follow the same dynamics, the
RO has a negligible value since it is likely that it will be always at-the-money. Conversely, if the
two random variables are not perfectly correlated or the two variables follow different dynamics,
it is unlikely that at every point in time Pt and Kt coincide, and this adds value to the RO.
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Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis of the results using a yearly λK in the range (0; λˆP ] with an initial strike
price K0 in the range [20; 100], both with a yearly σK equal to the yearly σP (upper left panel) and with
and a scaled down yearly σK (upper right panel), and with a correlation ρ in the range [−1; 1] (bottom
panel) (here σK = σP ). The RO value is expressed in ¤/MWh.
Finally, Figure 6 shows the effect of a disjoint variation in the two volatilities, with a yearly
σP and σK in the range (0; 2σˆP ], for different levels of ρ (in these graphs, λK is always equal to
λP = λˆP ). When ρ ≤ 0, the RO price is always increasing in the electricity price volatility σP and
in the strike price’s one σK . This is as expected, since volatility adds value to the call options.
Instead, when ρ > 0, the fact that the two processes move together can lower the aggregate risk,
since the spread between the electricity price and the strike price reduces. This translates into a
negative effect on the option value. The RO value is minimized when σP = σK . In Figure 6, panel
ρ = 0.5, we can see that the option value is still positive; in the panel ρ = 1, the RO value becomes
null for σP = σK , since, as mentioned, if the two processes are perfectly positively correlated, the
RO value coincides with its intrinsic value. Thus, there is a non-monotone effect of the volatility
increase of one process, depending on the amount of volatility of the other process, and on the
level of the correlation coefficient. The inflection is maximum when the two processes are perfectly
positively correlated.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the value of the RO from a financial perspective. The financial
approach to option pricing relies on the assumption that a risk-neutral measure exists, which is
equivalent to assume that markets are complete. This is not a problem for pricing options on
electricity prices, as long as they can be written on electricity futures that can be rolled over
the delivery period of the RO. Nevertheless, such an approach does require that RO markets are
competitive and that forward markets are liquid. Our analysis provides a benchmark value for
the RO, under the assumption that the market for the derivative is liquid enough to bring about
competition.12 Therefore, the simplified mathematical model that we proposed can be seen as a
starting point in the analysis of ROs. We obtain semi-explicit formulae for the value of the RO,
under a set of different assumptions with increasing realism and complexity. We move from simple
integrals of call options written on GBMs to correlated mean reverting processes that capture the
behavior of realistic electricity price time series, on the one hand, and complex rules for RO, on
the other. Then, we simulate the value of the Reliability Option through a real-market calibration
12Note that according to [6, 12] ROs are instruments that enhance competition in the electricity market.
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Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis of the RO value to a disjoint variation in the two volatilities, with a yearly
σP and σK in the range (0; 2σˆP ] (here λK = λP ). In the different panels, we can see how a variation in
the correlation coefficient ρ affects the RO value: when the two processes are independent or negatively
correlated, higher σP and σK result in a higher option value. However, when the correlation is positive
(middle right and bottom panels), the higher the correlation, and the more the two volatilities are similar,
the lower the value of the option. The RO value is expressed in ¤/MWh.
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of the parameters.
The results evidence that the value of the RO moves consistently with expectations from option
theory: a rise in the strike price lowers the RO value, which depends positively on the volatility
of the electricity price, as well as on the volatility of the strike price itself. The mean reversion
speed of the processes reduces the impact of the starting point, which was another expected result.
However, when both the strike price and the electricity price are assumed to be stochastic processes,
the value of the RO depends crucially on their correlation coefficient ρ. In particular, a positive
correlation reduces the value of the RO. Moreover, there is a non-monotone impact of the volatility
of one process, depending on the level of volatility of the other process and on a positive correlation.
This is important when designing the rule of the RO. For instance, if the strike price is allowed to
change with respect to a reference marginal cost, which is also believed to be the technology setting
the system marginal price at the day ahead level, the two process clearly covariate positively. In
this case, it is very likely that a RO has a very limited value, for every possible starting value
of the state variables P and K. More in general, our results show that a careful estimate of the
parameters is needed to calculate the value of the ROs. Ceteris paribus, the RO value will be
lower as the volatility of the electricity price decreases, the strike price increases, the speed of
mean reversion increases, the correlation of the electricity price with the strike price increases (if
the strike price is allowed to change over time), and the two volatilities are closer. These are all
factors that need to be taken into account when designing the market for ROs and calculating the
equilibrium value.
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Appendix
A.1 Proofs of pricing formulae
Proof of Proposition 3.1. The quantity f(s, ω) : = e−rsQ(Ps(ω) − K)+ in Equation (2) is non-
negative.
Then, if we set
A(K,P0, s) : = e
−rsEQ
[
(Ps −K)+
∣∣∣F0] , (A.1)
by Tonelli’s theorem, we get
RO(T1, T2) = Q
∫ T2
T1
A(K,P0, s)ds . (A.2)
A(K,P0, s) is clearly the price of a European call option with strike price K and maturity s, thus
Equation (6) is simply obtained with the Black and Scholes formula.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. As in the proof of Proposition 3.1, if we write
A(K0, P0, s) : = e
−rsEQ
[
(Ps −Ks)+
∣∣∣F0] , (A.3)
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then, by Tonelli’s theorem, we have
RO(T1, T2) = Q
∫ T2
T1
A(K0, P0, s)ds .
Here, A(K,P0, s) is the price of an exchange option between the electricity price P and the strike
price K, with maturity s, thus Equation (8) is simply obtained with the Margrabe formula with
dividends (see [10]).
Proof of Proposition 3.3. As in the previous proofs, we writeA(K,P0, s) : = e
−rsEQ
[
(Ps −K)+
∣∣∣F0]
and apply Tonelli’s theorem to obtain
RO(T1, T2) = Q
∫ T2
T1
A(K,P0, s)ds .
We now notice that
A(K,P0, s) = e
−rsEQ
[
(f(s, s)−K)+
∣∣∣F0]
where f(t, s), t ∈ [0, s], has the dynamics
df(t, s) = f(t, s)σe−λ(s−t) dWt
The result then follows from the Black-Scholes formula with time-dependent (deterministic) volatil-
ity, which enters into the formula via the integral of its square, here equal to∫ s
0
(
σe−λ(s−t)
)2
dt =
σ2
2λ
(1− e−2λs) = V ar(s)
Equation (12) follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. As before, we write A(P0,K0, s) : = e
−rsEQ [ (Ps −Ks)+ | F0], we use
Tonelli’s theorem and obtain
RO(T1, T2) = Q
∫ T2
T1
A(K,P0,K0, s)ds .
Now, as in the proof of Proposition 3.3, we now notice that
A(K,P0, s) = e
−rsEQ
[
(fP (s, s)− fK(s, s))+
∣∣∣F0]
where
fi(t, s), t ∈ [0, s], I = P,K, have the dynamics
dfP (t, s) = fP (t, s)σxe
−λx(s−t) dW 1t ,
dfK(t, s) = fK(t, s)σye
−λy(s−t) dW 2t ,
The result then follows from the Margrabe formula with time-dependent (deterministic) volatilities,
which now enters into the formula via the integral of the squared volatility of fp(·, s)/fK(·, s) (see
e.g. [15]), here equal to∫ s
0
(
σ2xe
−2λx(s−t) + σ2ye
−2λy(s−t) − 2ρσxσye−(λx+λy)(s−t)
)
dt = V ar(s)
Equation (15) follows.
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